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1. Introduction 
In this study we examine the informational properties of the earnings measures used in 
performance covenants, which are often included in private debt contracts. One of the key roles 
of accounting is to generate information about a firm’s performance that is useful for writing 
debt contracts. Surprisingly, we know very little about the attributes of the actual earnings 
measures that are used in performance covenants, probably because realizations of this number 
are not easily obtainable.1 In this study, we identify a sample of firms that disclose earnings 
realizations, as defined in the debt contract, and provide direct evidence on the properties of 
earnings measures used in performance covenants of bank debt contracts. 
There is considerable debate surrounding the properties of accounting earnings that are 
desirable for writing debt contracts. Several studies argue that because lenders care more about 
downside risk, they prefer conservative earnings measures (e.g., Watts, 2003 A, B). They argue 
that conservative accounting facilitates timelier creditor intervention by reducing the verifiability 
threshold of losses that can trigger covenant violations, allowing lenders to mitigate their 
downside lending risk. Others (e.g., Leuz, 2001; Gigler et al., 2009) highlight that while 
lowering the verifiability threshold of losses facilitates timelier creditor intervention, it also 
increases the incidence of “false positives” caused by uninformative losses that are not indicative 
of future performance.  
Other research suggests that the primary consideration in formulation of contractual 
accounting rules in debt contracts is the removal of transitory items that are not indicative of 
																																																						
1 Some studies collect data on the definitions of contractual adjustments made to GAAP earnings to arrive at 
earnings measures used in debt contracts (Leftwich, 1983; Li, 2010, 2016). However, as we explain in Section 2, 
whether and how these adjustments collectively alter informational properties of GAAP earnings is nearly 
impossible to assess from definitions alone. Moreover, because these definitions are usually idiosyncratic and often 
contain items that are unavailable in the Compustat database or the 10-K filed with the SEC, it is infeasible to 
construct the time-series of contractual earnings realizations from definitions.   
 
	
2 
future performance (e.g., Li, 2010). The argument is that transitory items can dampen the ability 
of earnings to predict future cash flows, leading to unnecessary covenant violations that induce 
costly renegotiations and inefficient wealth transfers. Therefore, the argument suggests lenders 
will prefer earnings measures that exclude transitory items and predict future cash flows well.  
In this study, we inform this debate by directly examining the extent of conservatism and 
cash flow predictive ability of earnings used in performance covenants of private debt contracts. 
We focus our attention on performance covenant earnings, because these covenants represent the 
main contractual mechanism through which borrowers’ periodic earnings performance directly 
affects contractual outcomes (e.g., Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012).2 To execute our tests, we 
identify a set of firms that disclose earnings realizations as defined under the accounting rules 
specified in the debt contract for use in performance covenants (hereafter, PERF COV 
EARNINGS). We identify our sample by conducting keyword searches of public filings made 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) using the Lexis-Nexis and 10KWizard 
search engines.3 After imposing necessary data requirements, this procedure yields a sample of 
128 firms, corresponding to 1,721 observations. 
For this sample of firms we compare the informational properties of PERF COV 
EARNINGS to that of two FASB GAAP based earnings measures: NET INCOME and EBITDA.4  
																																																						
2 As Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) note, financial covenants can be classified into two types – capital covenants 
and performance covenants. Performance covenants are designed to measure periodic performance and rely on 
income statement information in conjunction with balance sheet data (e.g., interest coverage ratio or debt-to-
EBITDA ratio). In contrast, capital covenants are typically based on balance sheet accounts (e.g., net worth, debt to 
equity) and are designed to measure the equity capital retained inside the borrower. 
3 The search terms used were as follows: ebitda w/2 (defined or adjusted or bank) w/20 (credit w/2 agreement). We 
supplemented this search with the phrases “credit agreement ebitda,” “ebitda as defined,” “bank defined cash flow,” 
“trailing twelve months,” “ebitda w/20 reconcil,*” and “covenant cushion.”  After doing the initial screening using 
key word searches, we manually read each filing to record the earnings number and to ensure that the disclosed 
earnings measure is indeed the one used for performance covenants. We provide an example in Appendix A. 
4 GAAP does not require firms to report EBITDA. When we use the abbreviation EBITDA, we are referring to the 
sum of the firm’s Net Income, Depreciation & Amortization Expense, Interest Expense, and Tax Expense, as 
reported on the firm’s income statement (per Compustat). 
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Our main focus is to examine whether PERF COV EARNINGS differ from NET INCOME; 
however, benchmarking PERF COV EARNINGS against EBITDA is also useful for exploring to 
what extent contractual adjustments beyond interest, taxes, and depreciation shape the properties 
of PERF COV EARNINGS.  
Our initial descriptive analyses reveal marked differences in the magnitudes of PERF 
COV EARNINGS and NET INCOME and EBITDA. We find that PERF COV EARNINGS are 
greater than NET INCOME (EBITDA) for more than 99% (84%) of our observations.  The 
magnitudes of the differences are also quite large: for the median firm, NET INCOME (EBITDA) 
is lower than PERF COV EARNINGS by about 87% (10%). Overall, the descriptive evidence 
suggests that, on average, the contractual adjustments made in debt contracts are economically 
large and income increasing. 
In the next analysis, we use the Basu (1997) measure of asymmetric timely loss 
recognition to examine the extent of conditional conservatism in PERF COV EARNINGS and 
FASB GAAP earnings. We start the analysis by confirming that, consistent with prior research, 
NET INCOME exhibits asymmetric loss timeliness for our sample firms, while EBITDA does 
not. We find that PERF COV EARNINGS are not asymmetrically timely with respect to losses; 
instead, we find that PERF COV EARNINGS are asymmetrically timely with respect to gains.  
We next compare the cash flow predictive ability of these three earnings measures by 
using the R-squared from regressions of one-year-ahead operating cash flows on each of the 
three different earnings measures.  We find that the R-squared from the regression of PERF COV 
EARNINGS is both statistically and economically larger than the R-squared from corresponding 
regressions for GAAP based earnings measures.  Specifically, the R-squared for PERF COV 
EARNINGS is about 77% (50%) greater than R-squared for NET INCOME (EBITDA). These 
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results suggest that PERF COV EARNINGS has significantly greater cash flow predictive ability 
than FASB GAAP-based earnings measures.   
Because we have a small sample, we perform several analyses to test the generalizability 
of our results to the broader sample of firms with performance covenants in their private debt 
contracts, as captured by the Dealscan database. First, we find that our sample firms are similar 
to the sample of Dealscan firms on a variety of characteristics including the levels of 
conservatism and cash flow predictive ability of FASB GAAP earnings. We also provide 
evidence that our firms did not experience any change in these two earnings properties around 
the period when the decision to disclose was made. Moreover, fewer than 20% of our sample 
firms had new or amended contracts in the quarter prior to first disclosure, indicating most firms 
did not experience any changes in debt contract accounting rules prior to the disclosure decision. 
These findings suggests that the contracting environment shaping the design of debt contracts for 
our sample firms is broadly similar to that for the larger sample and the disclosure decision does 
not seem to have been triggered by any changes in the design of debt contracts.  
Second, we compare the contractual definitions of PERF COV EARNINGS for our 
sample firms with the definitions for a matched sample of firms from the Dealscan database that 
do not disclose the realizations of PERF COV EARNINGS. We find that the number and nature 
of adjustments used to arrive at PERF COV EARNINGS for our sample firms are nearly identical 
to those for firms in the matched control sample. This suggests that the contractual definitions of 
PERF COV EARNINGS are not driving the disclosure decision, and provides assurance that the 
accounting rules used to calculate performance covenants in the debt contracts of our sample 
firms are similar to the accounting rules used to calculate performance covenants in the debt 
contracts of firms that choose not to disclose PERF COV EARNINGS.  
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Finally, to ensure our results are not unique to our small sample we use a machine-
readable proxy for PERF COV EARNINGS to provide large sample evidence. Demerjian and 
Owens (2015) suggest that Compustat item “Operating Income Before Depreciation” (OIBDP) is 
a good proxy for PERF COV EARNINGS.  We first confirm the validity of the proxy by showing 
the two measures are highly correlated (88% Spearman correlation) in our sample.  We then 
provide evidence in our sample that OIBDP exhibits similar levels of asymmetric gain timeliness 
and cash flow predictive ability to actual PERF COV EARNINGS. Finally, we show that OIBDP 
exhibits asymmetric gain timeliness and significantly higher cash flow predictive ability than 
NET INCOME for the larger sample of borrowers in Dealscan database. Jointly, these results 
suggest that our findings are likely to generalize to the broader sample of borrowers. 
Overall, our results indicate that the accounting rules used in performance covenants 
produce earnings realizations that are not conditionally conservative and are more predictive of 
future cash flows than GAAP measures.  These results are consistent with the arguments in Leuz 
(2001) and Gigler et al. (2009) that contracting parties are concerned with the cost of “false 
alarms” and lend support to the conjecture in Skinner (2011) that the costs of monitoring and 
enforcing covenants are perhaps much higher than typically assumed.5  
Our results illustrate the complex trade-offs lenders face when designing contractual 
accounting rules.  Lenders desire measures that are informative of future cash flows, and they 
also desire measures that provide timely information with respect to losses and/or gains. While it 
is possible that cash flow predictive ability can be improved without sacrificing timeliness, it is 
																																																						
5 While it is beyond the scope of our paper to investigate the specific nature of these costs, we note that in addition 
to hold-up and other agency costs, lenders are likely to be concerned with the effects of “false alarms” on both 
regulatory capital and regulatory oversight.  For example, on pp 47 of the Comptrollers Handbook the OCC 
indicates that covenant violations are one of the elements that can trigger reclassifications of loans from Pass to 
substandard status and on page 62 they indicate that the banks tendency to waive covenants can be a sign of a 
structural weakness.  See http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/rcr.pdf. 
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also possible that improving the measure on one dimension diminishes its qualities on the other. 
Our analysis shows that in the setting of performance covenants these trade-offs result in a 
performance metric that is not conditionally conservative and a significantly better predictor of 
future cash flows than corresponding GAAP measures. 
Our study extends existing research on the accounting measurement rules used in debt 
contracts (e.g., Leftwich, 1983; El Gazzar and Pastena, 1990; Li, 2010; and Li, 2016). This 
research primarily examines the definitions of measurement rules used in debt contracts, and 
finds that there are a variety of adjustments made to GAAP NET INCOME when defining 
contractual performance measures, but they do not provide much evidence on the magnitude of 
these adjustments. Our paper suggests that the contractual adjustments made to GAAP NET 
INCOME to derive PERF COV EARNINGS are economically large, on average income 
increasing, and result in systematic changes in the informational properties of GAAP NET 
INCOME. 
Our paper is also related to studies that examine how the properties of accounting 
systems affect the nature of contractual arrangements between lenders and borrowers (e.g., 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2005; Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari, 2008; Bharath, 
Sunder, and Sunder, 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008; Zhang, 2008; and Christensen and 
Nikolaev, 2012). These studies focus on the debt contracting value of accounting output 
produced using GAAP rules and abstract away from the contractual tailoring in the contract. The 
economically large differences in the informational properties of PERF COV EARNINGS and 
NET INCOME we document suggest that a significant portion of the informational demands of 
debt holders are addressed through contractual tailoring.   
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We also note that our results do not imply that conservative accounting is not desirable 
for elements of the debt contracts beyond performance covenants, nor do they imply 
conservatism in FASB GAAP is suboptimal in general. For example, as opposed to the 
performance covenants that we study, Beatty et al. (2008) show that contractual definitions of net 
worth underlying capital covenants include conservative adjustments. This suggests that the 
lender’s demand for conservative accounting rules depends on the underlying covenants included 
in the contract. This is consistent with Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) who argue that capital 
covenants (as opposed to performance covenants) are designed to ensure that a minimum amount 
of equity capital is retained inside the firm and conservative accounting may facilitate this role 
by providing lower bound estimates of firms’ liquidation value (Watts, 2003a,b). Kothari, 
Ramana, and Skinner (2010) argue that conservatism can also alleviate agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders. Watts (2003a) also offers shareholder litigation, taxation, and 
regulators’ incentives as additional explanations for conservatism. Thus, a multitude of research 
provides myriad explanations for the properties observed in FASB GAAP earnings, while our 
results specifically apply to earnings used in performance covenants in private debt contracts. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related empirical 
evidence and details the regulatory requirements that affect disclosure of contractual earnings. 
Section 3 describes the relevant theoretical research and develops our hypotheses. Section 4 
describes our data and sample. Section 5 presents our main findings and Section 6 provides some 
additional tests. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background 
2.1 Existing evidence on accounting measurement in debt contracts 
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The extant work on the accounting measurement rules used in debt contracts is primarily 
based on an analysis of the qualitative definitions of the contractual adjustments. Leftwich 
(1983) is the seminal paper in this field.  He provides qualitative evidence on the definitions of 
net income used in debt contracts by examining the American Bar Association’s Commentaries 
on Indentures, which contains information on the typical adjustments made by bondholders to 
FASB GAAP. Leftwich (1983) finds that contractual modifications are typically designed to 
disallow some increases in income that are allowable under FASB GAAP, and require some 
decreases in income that are not required by FASB GAAP. He concludes that the purpose of 
these conservative adjustments is to restrict management’s ability to make accounting choices 
that benefit stockholders at the expense of lenders.   
El-Gazzar and Pastena (1990) focus on private lending agreements made by banks and 
insurance lenders. They find that all contracts with insurance lenders tailor GAAP income 
compared to 21% of those with banks. They attribute this difference to the relatively high 
renegotiation costs for bank lenders relative to insurance lenders. They argue that because of 
high renegotiation costs, contracts with bank lenders exhibit less tailoring to provide borrowers 
with more flexibility to avoid violating covenants. In contrast, because insurance agreements 
bear lower renegotiation costs, lenders can restrict managerial actions by tailoring and then 
waive covenant violations if advantageous. They also find that contractual tailoring in private 
debt contracts puts contractual accounting closer to cash-flow basis accounting. 
Using an approach similar to the above studies, Li (2010) examines the contractual 
definition of net income in syndicated loan contracts. He finds that the most common 
adjustments remove earnings items that appear transitory, while conservative adjustments that 
include certain types of negative earnings but exclude positive earnings are less common. This 
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finding is also confirmed in Demerjian (2011). Specifically, he investigates the definition of net 
income in private debt agreements and documents that removal of non-recurring earnings items 
constitutes the most common adjustment.  Beatty et al. (2015) confirm this result in the 
calculation of adjusted EBITDA, finding that non-recurring items are often excluded from this 
measure when the firm has previously incurred non-recurring items, but they are not excluded 
when they are informative of future performance. 
Collectively, these studies suggest that FASB GAAP does not sufficiently fulfill the 
informational needs of debt contracting parties, and the shortcomings are addressed through 
contractual tailoring. However, the conclusions that the authors draw regarding the specific 
nature of contractual adjustments are quite distinct. Leftwich (1983) draws the conclusion that 
the adjustments are being used to make net income more conservative, El-Gazaar and Pastena 
(1990) argue that the adjustments are being used to make net income closer to cash flows, but 
draw no conclusions on asymmetric timeliness, and Li (2010) and Demerjian (2011) suggest that 
adjustments are designed to omit transitory items and Beatty et al. (2015) indicate they omit 
transitory items that are not informative of future performance. 
Our study moves this empirical literature forward on at least two fronts. First, most of the 
studies discussed above examine the contractual definitions of net income.  While net income 
plays an important role in the capital covenants, most performance covenants are based on a 
form of “adjusted EBITDA”, which is likely to be substantially different from the contractual 
definition of net income.  This is particularly important, as performance covenants are more 
common than capital covenants, and are more likely to be violated than capital covenants.6 
																																																						
6 Demerjian (2011) documents that while the use of capital covenants has declined from about 80% of deals in 1996 
to 32% in 2007, the use of income statement based covenants has remain stable between 74% to 82% of deals. 
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Second, unlike prior work, we examine realizations of contractual earnings instead of 
definitions. This approach allows us to study the aggregate effect of a diverse set of adjustments 
on the informational properties of the final earnings measure, which is difficult to reliably do 
using definitions because for many of the adjustments it is difficult to assess the informational 
properties, magnitudes, and recurrence from the names alone.7  
Moreover, even if one could assess the nature and properties of contractual adjustments 
from the names, several conceptual difficulties remain when trying to assess the aggregate effect 
of these adjustments on the cash flow predictive ability and asymmetric timeliness of the final 
earnings number. For example, although Li (2010, 2016) finds that contractual earnings tend to 
exclude transitory earnings items, it is not clear if removal of such items would help or hinder 
cash flow predictive abilities of the number. This is because many transitory earnings items 
represent one-time capitalizations of changes in expected future cash flows (e.g., asset 
impairments; effect of discontinued operations; restructuring charges), which might make them 
useful for predicting future cash flows (e.g., Kim and Kross, 2005; Fairfield et al., 2009).  
Similarly, Li (2016) finds that in addition to conservative adjustments, definitions of 
performance covenants earnings also tend to include some non-conservative adjustments that 
allow for exclusion of non-cash expenses but not non-cash income. Without data on the relative 
magnitudes and frequency of the two types of adjustments, it is difficult to assess how and to 
what extent the adjustments alter the asymmetric timeliness of FASB GAAP net income. Finally, 
without data on the magnitude of adjustments, one cannot assess if the adjustments are large 
																																																																																																																																																																														
Christensen and Nikoalev (2012) find that performance covenants are associated with frequent renegotiations but 
capital covenants are not. 
7 For example, Pharmerica Corporation is allowed to exclude costs from what seems like a non-recurring item 
labeled “Integration, merger and acquisition related costs and other charges,” but in fact these charges recurred in 
magnitudes of $29.8 million, $26.7 million, $5.2 million, $14.6 million, and $15.3 million each year from 2007 to 
2011 compared to NET INCOME of $24.1 million, $5 million, $42.2 million, $19.2 million, and $23 million in the 
same years. 
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enough to result in economically significant changes in the statistical properties of FASB GAAP 
net income. 
2.2  Regulations regarding disclosures of Covenant Calculations 
The key innovation in our study is that we examine the earnings realizations as calculated 
under the rules governing the debt contract (i.e. Adjusted EBITDA), thus it is useful to 
understand why some firms (and not all firms) disclose these realizations.  In December 2003, 
the SEC provided public companies guidance on the preparation of the Management Discussion 
and Analysis section of the 10-K financial report.8  One of the key elements of this regulation is 
related to the disclosures firms make regarding their liquidity.  The SEC indicates that if a 
company has entered into a debt contract, and the contract includes covenants that limit a firm’s 
ability to raise debt, they are required to discuss the covenants in their filing.  Specifically the 
MD&A rules indicate that: 
If these (debt related) covenants limit, or are reasonably likely to limit, a company's 
ability to undertake financing to a material extent, the company is required to discuss the 
covenants in question and the consequences of the limitation to the company's financial 
condition and operating performance.9 
 
As part of these disclosures, firms often voluntarily choose to provide discussion of both the 
thresholds of the debt limiting covenants that are included in their financial contracts, as well as 
the realization of the metrics included in these covenants.  As firms started disclosing contractual 
EBITDA, the SEC provided additional guidance on the disclosure of earnings realizations as 
calculated under the contract.10 More specifically, the SEC notes: 
																																																						
8 See section 1 part D and Section 4 Part D for the general and specific rules at the following website: 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8350.htm 
9 See Section 4 Part D at https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8350.htm 
10 See the SEC’s interpretation of the rules and regulations related to disclosure of non-GAAP measures at 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/nongaapinterp.htm. In addition to the MD&A requirements, 
Regulation G (Reg-G) also governs disclosure of non-GAAP measures. Reg-G, however, does not affect our sample 
selection because it does not require firms to disclose contractual earnings; rather, if a firm decides to publicly 
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“if management believes that the credit agreement is a material agreement, that the covenant 
is a material term of the credit agreement and that information about the covenant is 
material to an investor's understanding of the company's financial condition and/or liquidity, 
then the company may be required to disclose the measure as calculated by the debt 
covenant as part of its MD&A.” 
 
These disclosure requirements have important implications for our study. First, our 
sample is likely to contain firms with more leverage for which the credit agreement and the 
covenant terms are more likely to be material. Second, firms making these disclosures typically 
have some form of Debt/EBITDA type of covenant, where the covenant limits the firm’s ability 
to raise debt.  Third, many firms satisfy the disclosure requirement without necessarily disclosing 
the contractual earnings numbers. For example, many firms satisfy the requirement by disclosing 
the performance covenant ratio (e.g., debt-to-Adjusted EBITDA ratio) and not the earnings 
number underlying the ratio.11  
In Appendix A, we provide an example of the disclosures made by one of our sample 
firms, Xerium Technologies.  Xerium has two performance covenants in their contract (fixed 
charge and interest coverage).  Both covenants limit the firm’s ability to raise debt, as additional 
debt increases interest and fixed charges.  Consistent with Leftwich (1983), net income serves as 
the starting point for performance covenant calculations.  Consistent with Li (2010) and 
Demerjian (2011), adjustments are made to net income to eliminate “below the line items” like 
cumulative effects of accounting changes and extraordinary items.  There is also an adjustment 
for pensions, and investments in unconsolidated subs. 
																																																																																																																																																																														
disclose contractual earnings, then Reg G requires the firm to also provide a reconciliation of the contractual 
earnings measure with the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure. 
11 For example, The Barnes Group, a firm in our sample, disclosed the realizations of the Debt to EBITDA ratio, as 
defined under their debt agreement between 2003 and 2005, and then expanded their disclosure, by disclosing both 
the numerator and denominator over the period 2006 through 2016.  Many of the firms in our sample are similar, in 
the sense that once they start disclosing the data underlying the numerator and denominator, they continue to do this 
for many years into the future. 
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Consistent with the observations in Demerjian and Owens (2015), the two performance 
covenants (fixed charge and interest coverage) are not based on net income, but instead are based 
on adjusted EBITDA.12 The contract includes 13 additional adjustments to move from 
contractual net income to adjusted EBITDA. In their public filings, Xerium discloses the 
calculation of adjusted EBITDA as calculated under the contractual rules.  As the exhibit in the 
Appendix A suggests, in some periods the adjustments that are made are quite substantial. 
The inclusion of 13 adjustments to calculate Adjusted EBITDA as defined in Xerium’s 
contract is not particularly unusual.  Li (2016) examines a random sample of 100 contracts and 
finds that definitions of performance covenant earnings include an average of approximately 6.5 
adjustments compared to a mean of one adjustment to the definition of net income reported in Li 
(2010).13 Given that bulk of the contractual tailoring involves adjustments other than those made 
to the contractual definitions of net income, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the 
informational properties of performance covenant earnings from the above studies.  
3. Theory and hypotheses development 
In this section, we first describe the existing theoretical work on the desirable 
informational properties of accounting numbers for writing tripwire covenants (Section 3.1). We 
then build upon this theoretical work to develop our hypotheses regarding conservatism and cash 
flow predictive ability of the earnings measures included in performance covenants (Section 3.2). 
3.1 Existing theoretical work on desirable informational properties for tripwire covenants 
																																																						
12 In the supplemental analysis section of our paper we compare actual realizations of PERF COV EARNINGS to the 
Compustat measure OIBDP, which Demerjian and Owens (2015) suggest is the best Compustat proxy for adjusted 
EBITDA used in debt contracts. For Xerium, in the Appendix A we also attempt to reconcile OIBDP and PERF 
COV EARNINGS. We find that there are significant differences between the two measures for some firms, but that 
the correlation between the two measures is high.  
13 We calculated these averages by summing all adjustments (including adding back interest taxes and deprecation) 
and dividing by the number of contracts. 
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 Tripwire covenants that transfer control rights to lenders following poor performance 
emerge endogenously as part of the optimal contract between lenders and borrowers in the 
presence of agency problems. Several studies show that in a world of incomplete contracting the 
provision of such covenants mitigates the adverse effects of agency frictions between firms and 
capital providers and facilitates securing of financing ex ante (e.g., Zender, 1991; Aghion and 
Bolton, 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994).14 More relevant to our research question, the 
generic insight from these models is that covenants should be written on accounting signals that 
accurately reflect the state of the nature. As discussed in Christensen et al. (2016), however, the 
key limitation of these models is that they consider accounting output as an exogenously 
generated noisy signal of the true state of nature and do not explicitly model the trade-offs 
associated with accounting systems with different informational properties.  
Several recent studies address this issue by explicitly incorporating into the models 
accounting systems with different informational properties.  For example, Gigler et al. (2009), 
Caskey and Hughes (2012), and Li (2013) examine the efficiency effects of modifying the extent 
of differential verifiability threshold for gain versus loss recognition.  In these studies, 
asymmetrically decreasing the verifiability threshold for loss recognition facilitates timelier 
creditor intervention by decreasing the incidence of false negative errors; however, it also 
increases the incidence of false positive errors triggered by noisy losses that are not indicative of 
the true state of the nature. Therefore, in these models, whether conditionally conservative 
accounting benefits or hurts debt contracting efficiency depends on the relative costs of the two 
errors, which in turn depends on the specifics of the agency problem considered in these models. 
For example, Gigler et al. (2009) examine a setting in which the role of the accounting based 
																																																						
14 For a comprehensive survey of the related work, see Christensen, Nikolaev, Wittenberg-Moerman (2016).  
 
	
15 
debt covenant is to allocate control rights between shareholders and lenders over the decision to 
liquidate or continue a project that has already been financed by the lenders. They find that in 
this setting the costs of inefficient liquidation of a good project (i.e., costs of false positives) 
dominate the costs of continuation of a bad project (costs of false negatives), making more 
liberal accounting desirable from a debt contracting perspective.15 Alternatively, Caskey and 
Hughes (2012) modify the Gigler et al. (2009) model by allowing for the possibility of asset 
substitution, which can increase the relative costs of false negative signals.  They find that 
conservative accounting becomes optimal when asset substitution problem is sufficiently severe. 
Similarly, Li (2013) introduces renegotiation costs to identify situations where conservative 
accounting is desirable. Overall, the above studies highlight that whether and to what extent 
conservatism is desirable for writing performance covenants is theoretically ambiguous and 
ultimately an empirical question. 
The above theoretical studies directly examine the desirable statistical properties of the 
earnings output for writing tripwire covenants and abstract away from the nature of accounting 
principles or rules that would be required to generate the earnings output with the desired 
properties. Gao (2013) highlights the difficulties associated with making inferences about the 
underlying accounting principles by examining the statistical properties of the earnings output. 
We therefore note that while our evidence directly sheds light on the desirable statistical 
properties of earnings measure for writing performance covenants, any inferences regarding the 
underlying accounting rules that generate this measure should be drawn with caution. 
It is important to note that lenders have mechanisms other than accounting measurement 
rules to affect the allocation of control rights.  For example, lenders can choose to make covenant 
																																																						
15 This result is consistent with the arguments in Leuz (2001) and Lambert (2010) highlighting the inefficiencies that 
may result from untimely recognition of economic gains. 
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thresholds tight or loose. By adjusting measurement rules, one can fine-tune which specific types 
of transactions and events can trigger covenant violations. Increasing (decreasing) the covenant 
threshold, however, causes an across the board tightening (loosening) of the covenant, without 
necessarily altering the nature of transactions/events that can trigger covenant violations.16 For 
example, consider a borrower with goodwill on its balance sheet and a bank loan with a 3-year 
maturity. Suppose that goodwill impairments for this borrower indicate decline in long-run 
prospects (over horizons greater than 3 years) but have no implications for the cash flow 
generating ability over the next three years. If false alarms are costly, it would be optimal to alter 
the measurement rules to exclude goodwill impairments. Note that this problem cannot be as 
efficiently resolved by simply varying the covenant threshold alone. Loosening the covenant by 
increasing the threshold would decrease the likelihood that goodwill impairments trigger 
violations; but, it would also decrease the likelihood of other potentially credit relevant losses 
triggering the violations, reducing the efficiency of the debt contract.  
As this simple example illustrates, covenant thresholds and the extent of asymmetric 
loss/gain timeliness do not represent equivalent ways (from an efficiency perspective) of 
tightening/loosening the contract. Both affect the efficiency of the contracts in different ways and 
the contracting parties would be expected to choose a combination of measurement rules and 
covenant threshold that maximizes the efficiency of debt contracts. Our study provides insights 
on the optimal set of measurement rules chosen by contracting parties for writing performance 
covenants. Future research could also examine how, for a given set of measurement rules, 
contracting parties vary covenant thresholds to maximize debt contracting efficiency.  
 3.2 Hypotheses 
																																																						
16 See, also, Leuz (1998) for a discussion of this point in the context of dividend restrictions.  
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While the theoretical work directly examines the optimal properties of earnings for 
writing debt covenants, in practice it is not possible to derive a complete set of rules for each 
measure used in the contract.  Thus, contracting parties start with GAAP rules that are designed 
to meet the informational demands of a variety of stakeholders (Kothari et al (2010).  They then 
specify a multitude of contractual adjustments to arrive at a set of final measures (Leftwich 
(1983)). Our hypotheses are therefore based on the observation that the debt contracting parties 
will specify a set of contractual adjustments to GAAP Net Income to obtain a performance 
metric that exhibits informational properties that are as close as possible to the ones that 
maximize debt-contracting efficiency.   
Our first hypothesis relates to the desirability of the extent of conservatism for writing 
performance covenants. While it has been widely documented that GAAP NET INCOME is 
based on conservative accounting rules, as discussed in the previous section, the desirability of 
conservative earnings measures for writing performance covenants is theoretically ambiguous. If, 
as predicted by Gigler et al. (2009), debt-contracting parties are concerned with “false alarms”, 
then we may observe contractual adjustments in performance covenant earnings that attempt to 
reverse the conditional conservatism inherent in GAAP net income. On the other hand, if 
concerns over timely information regarding losses dominate, then contractual adjustments may 
not be designed to reverse the conservatism in GAAP number, and may even be designed to 
increase the conservatism in GAAP accounting rules. We, therefore, do not make any directional 
prediction about whether PERF COV EARNINGS are more, similarly, or less conservative than 
NET INCOME and consider it to be an empirical question. 
Our second hypothesis relates to the cash flow predictive ability of PERF COV 
EARNINGS. We examine cash flow predictive ability because future cash flows directly capture 
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the ability of borrowers to make principal and interest payments to lenders. As discussed earlier, 
theory on incomplete contracting (e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994) shows that the role of 
tripwire covenants is to facilitate timely creditor invention in borrowers’ operations when the 
borrower performance is expected to deteriorate. An earnings metric that is predictive of future 
cash flows would facilitate such timely intervention by creditors, making cash flow predictive 
ability a desirable attribute of the earnings measure underlying performance covenants.  
We hypothesize that PERF COV EARNINGS will exhibit greater cash flow predictive 
ability than NET INCOME for two reasons. First, because a common set of accounting standards 
are unlikely to perfectly capture the economic fundamentals of all firms, debt contracting parties 
may make idiosyncratic contractual adjustments to GAAP rules that result in a performance 
metric with superior ability to predict future performance. Second, because GAAP accounting 
rules balance complex trade-offs between the diverse informational demands imposed by a 
variety of stakeholders, NET INCOME is unlikely to be optimized to predict aspects of firm 
performance most relevant for lenders. For example, while lenders are likely to care more about 
the firms’ cash flows over the life of the loan, shareholders may prefer a performance metric that 
better predicts cash flows over longer horizons.  This possibility provides additional scope for 
contractual adjustments to improve upon the cash flow predictive ability of GAAP earnings. To 
the extent contractual adjustments are designed to address the above two deficiencies of GAAP, 
we expect PERF COV EARNINGS to exhibit greater cash flow predictive ability than NET 
INCOME. 
4.  Data and Sample 
 Our sample is comprised of firms that disclose contractual earnings (PERF COV 
EARNINGS) in form 10-K, form 10-Q, or form 8K filed with the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission (SEC) in at least one quarter. To identify our sample firms, we execute numerous 
searches of SEC filings using the Lexis Nexis and 10KWizard search engines. The primary 
search formula was the following: ebitda w/2 (defined or adjusted or bank) w/20 (credit w/2 
agreement). Results from this search are supplemented with searches for the phrases “credit 
agreement ebitda,” “ebitda as defined,” “bank defined cash flow,” “trailing twelve months,” 
“ebitda w/20 reconcil,*” and “covenant cushion.” We limit our search to firms that have publicly 
traded shares on one of the three major US exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX). Next, we 
manually filter false positive results from the search by reading the content returned by the 
searches. We only retain observations in which we can confirm that the disclosed earnings are, in 
fact, used in the firm’s debt contract.  
Our search procedure yields 233 firms that disclose PERF COV EARNINGS in at least 
one filing.17 We are unable to match 83 of the identified firms to Compustat, which results in 150 
usable firms. Most of the firms in our sample disclose PERF COV EARNINGS as the rolling sum 
of the earnings for the last four quarters. That is, at the end of the first quarter, the firm will 
report earnings as defined in the contract that represent earnings summed over the first quarter 
and the prior three quarters. In cases where the firm did not disclose PERF COV EARNINGS as 
an annual number, we calculate annual numbers using four quarterly observations. Thus the 150 
firms correspond to 2,200 quarterly observations of annual earnings. The first observation in our 
sample is in the fourth quarter of 1993, while the last observation is in the fourth quarter of 2013. 
As can be seen in Table 1, there is some sample attrition after requiring Compustat data 
to calculate NET INCOME (Compustat data item NIQ) and EBITDA (Compustat data items NI + 
																																																						
17 We drop one firm from the initial sample because it operates in the asset acceptance industry and has contractual 
adjustments that are extremely large. When we leave this firm in the dataset, it is flagged as on outlier in all of our 
regressions.   
 
	
20 
DPQ + XINTQ + TXTQ). We also require CASH FLOW one year in the future (Compustat data 
item OANCFY). Each of the quarterly Compustat variables is annualized on a rolling four-
quarter basis in order to be comparable with earnings based on Contractual GAAP as reported by 
the firms in our sample. We also require total assets (Compustat data item ATQ) at the end of the 
fiscal period for use as a scaling variable. Finally, we truncate the variables of interest at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles of their distributions. These criteria result in 128 firms corresponding to 
1,721 observations. In some of our tests, we impose more restrictive data requirements, and the 
effects of these requirements are also outlined in Table 1. Of note, when we estimate regressions 
following Basu (1997), we require market returns from CRSP, and we scale our earnings 
variables by the market value of equity from Compustat.18 The largest sample available for these 
tests has 1,152 observations, corresponding to 98 firms.  
Table 2 Panel A presents the distribution of our sample across 17 industries defined in 
Barth et al (2005). For comparison, we also provide the industry distribution for a broader 
sample of firms in Dealscan database that have a performance covenant in their loan contract. 
The table reveals no obvious differences in the industry concentration between our sample and 
the Dealscan sample, suggesting that the disclosure of performance covenant earnings is not 
driven by industry. In Table 2, Panels B and C, we also compare several other firm 
characteristics for our main sample as well as for the smaller sample used for asymmetric 
timeliness tests. In general, our sample firms appear to be slightly larger, to be slightly less 
profitable, to have more leverage, and to have lower book-to-market ratios than Dealscan firms, 
but none of the differences are extreme. Both samples also exhibit a similar distribution of stock 
returns. In a subsequent analysis, we also compare the cash flow predictive ability and 
																																																						
18 Computed as common shares outstanding at the end of the quarter multiplied by the price per common share at the 
end of the quarter (CSHOQ*PRCCQ). 
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asymmetric loss timeliness of the NET INCOME of our sample firms with that of the Dealscan 
sample and find them to be very similar.  
Table 3 provides more formal evidence on the differences between our sample firms and 
the broader sample of Dealscan firms by presenting probit model estimates of the decision to 
disclose contractual earnings. The covariates in the Probit model include: (i) firm size measured 
as the natural logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE); (ii) book leverage measured as total 
debt scaled by total assets (LEV); (iii) book-to-market ratio measured as book value of equity 
scaled by market value of equity (BM); (iv) annual stock return (RET); (v) net income scaled by 
assets (ROA); (vi) analyst forecast dispersion (STDEVU); (vii) analyst following 
(QTRNUMEST); (viii) lagged cash flow predictive ability of GAAP net income (RSQ5) 
measured as the adjusted r-square from firm-specific regressions of one year ahead operating 
cash flows on net income using five quarters of data, with the last quarter ending one year before 
end of quarter t; (ix) annual sales growth (DSALE);  (x) an indicator variable for whether or not 
the firm had negative net income (LOSS); and (xi) industry fixed effects using the industry 
classification from Barth et al. (2005).19 The disclosure model is estimated on a sample of 31,107 
firm-quarter observations representing all firms in the Dealscan database during our sample 
period that have a performance covenant in their loan contract and sufficient data to calculate the 
variables in the selection model.    
 Not surprisingly, estimates of the disclosure model show that the strongest predictor of 
the disclosure decision is leverage (Z-stat=5.35).  As discussed earlier, credit agreement and 
covenant terms are more likely to be assessed to be material for firms with higher leverage, 
resulting in a requirement to disclose covenant calculations as per the MD&A disclosure rules. 
																																																						
19 We select these variables based on the research on the decision to disclose pro-forma earnings (e.g., Bradshaw and 
Sloan, 2002;, Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004) 
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The only other variables with some predictive ability are RSQ5 (Z-stat=-1.77) and LOSS (Z-
stat=-1.99). RSQ5 has a negative coefficient, suggesting that firms whose NET INCOME 
numbers are relatively good at predicting future cash flows are less likely to disclose contractual 
earnings, and LOSS has a negative coefficient, indicating firms with negative GAAP earnings are 
less likely disclose contractual earnings. The results for LOSS variable and insignificant 
coefficient on ROA are inconsistent with the argument that firms choose to disclose contractual 
earnings opportunistically when GAAP earnings are poor.  
5.  Results 
 In this section, we present evidence on the degree of conservatism and cash flow 
predictive ability of PERF COV EARNINGS. We benchmark these two properties for PERF 
COV EARNINGS against GAAP NET INCOME and EBITDA. While our main focus is to 
examine how PERF COV EARNINGS differ from earnings under FASB GAAP (NET INCOME), 
we are also benchmarking against EBITDA to investigate the effect of adjustments other than 
adding back interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. We first present descriptive evidence 
on the distribution of contractual earnings in Subsection 5.1 and we then present the 
conservatism analysis in Subsection 5.2 and the cash flow predictive ability analysis in 
Subsection 5.3. We conclude by providing a discussion of the results in Subsection 5.4. 
5.1 Descriptive Evidence 
 Fig. 1 plots the distribution of PERF COV EARNINGS, NET INCOME, and EBITDA, 
each scaled by total assets. We find that relative to the distribution of PERF COV EARNINGS, 
the distribution of NET INCOME is shifted considerably to the left. Furthermore, unlike the 
distributions of NET INCOME and EBITDA, which have long left tails, the distribution of PERF 
COV EARNINGS does not have a significant left tail, does not assume negative values, and has a 
 
	
23 
significantly higher peak.20 Overall, Fig. 1 suggests that PERF COV EARNINGS are tailored 
such that they assume higher values than NET INCOME and EBITDA. 
 In Figures 2 and 3, we directly compare NET INCOME to PERF COV EARNINGS. 
Figure 2, Panel A shows the ratio of NET INCOME to PERF COV EARNINGS, while Panel B 
shows the difference between NET INCOME and PERF COV EARNINGS (the difference is 
scaled by total assets). Figure 3 provides a similar comparison between PERF COV EARNINGS 
and EBITDA.  All four panels suggest that contractual adjustments made for calculating PERF 
COV EARNINGS are mostly income increasing. Figure 3 highlights that, in addition to 
depreciation, amortization, interest, and taxes, PERF COV EARNINGS differ from NET 
INCOME because there are additional income-increasing adjustments in loan contracts.  
In Table 4, Panel A we tabulate descriptive statistics for the ratios. The mean (median) 
value for the ratio of NET INCOME to PERF COV EARNINGS is -0.038 (0.129), and the mean 
(median) value for the ratio of EBITDA to PERF COV EARNINGS is 0.757 (0.899). This 
indicates that for the median firm, NET INCOME (EBITDA) is 87.1% (10.1%) lower than PERF 
COV EARNINGS. The 75th percentile for the ratio of EBITDA to PERF COV EARNINGS is 
0.978, indicating that contractual earnings used in performance contracts are greater than 
EBITDA for over 75% of the observations.  
The significant differences in the distribution of PERF COV EARNINGS and GAAP-
based earnings also reflect in the relatively low correlation coefficients. Table 5, Panel A 
indicates that the (Spearman) correlation coefficient between PERF COV EARNINGS and NET 
INCOME is 0.50, and between PERF COV EARNINGS and EBITDA it is 0.74. Overall, the 
univariate analysis provides evidence of economically large contractual tailoring which suggests 
																																																						
20 PERF COV EARNINGS does take on negative values for five observations corresponding to three firms (about 
0.29 percent of the sample) before we truncate at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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that a significant portion of the informational demands of debt contracting parties is left unmet 
by FASB GAAP accounting rules. In the following analyses, we explore how this contractual 
tailoring alters the informational properties of GAAP based earnings. 
5.2 Conservatism Tests 
 In this subsection, we provide evidence on the extent of conditional conservatism in 
performance covenant earnings using Basu (1997) regressions. Specifically, we estimate various 
versions of the following regression specification: 
	 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑆! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁! + 𝛽!𝐷! + 𝛽!𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁!𝐷! + 𝜖! ,	 (1)  
in which EARNINGSt  represents NET INCOMEt, EBITDAt, or PERF COV EARNINGSt and 
RETURNt  represents the stock return for the four quarters ending at t, and Dt  is an indicator 
variable for negative stock returns.  Following prior research (e.g., Basu, 1997; Nikolaev, 2010), 
we scale the earnings numbers by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. The 
coefficient of interest, 𝛽!, measures the asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition. We compute 
standard errors by clustering at the firm level because of the rolling nature of firm-year 
observations. 
 Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. In Column (1), we first model the 
relationship between net income and returns to replicate the widely documented conservatism in 
NET INCOME.21 Consistent with prior studies, the coefficient 𝛽! on the interaction term 
RETURN*D is positive and significant, suggesting that net income exhibits conservatism.22 This 
																																																						
21 Recall that we use net income (Compustat item NI) in this test because we are making comparisons to a number 
defined by GAAP, while prior research (e.g., Nikolaev, 2010) often uses earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat item IB). We find that there is no significant difference statistically or economically between the 
coefficient estimates we report and those that we obtain when using earnings before extraordinary items as the 
dependent variable. 
22 Note that the insignificant coefficient on the main effect of RETURN is similar to prior research (Nikolaev, 2010), 
and is not of primary concern in our analysis. 
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finding mitigates concerns that our inferences from the subsequent analyses on this sample are 
affected by sample selection issues or by low power due to a small sample size. We later report 
several additional analyses in Section 6 to further show that self-selection issues do not drive our 
inferences. 
In Column (2), we change the dependent variable to EBITDA. In this model, the 
coefficient 𝛽! is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that EBITDA is not 
conservative and that the conservatism in net income is primarily caused by the items excluded 
from EBITDA (i.e., depreciation, amortization, interest expense, and taxes).  
 In the third column, we use PERF COV EARNINGS as the dependent variable. The 
coefficient 𝛽! is negative and significantly different from zero (coefficient=-0.318 and t-
statistics=3.20). This suggests that the contractual earnings used in performance covenants are 
not conservative, but exhibit timelier recognition of gains relative to losses. Moreover, we find 
that the sum of coefficients on RETURN and RETURN*D is statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that there is no reliable relation between performance covenant earnings and returns when there 
are economic losses. It is important to note that lack of a correlation between earnings and 
negative returns does not mean that earnings do not capture losses. Instead, it suggests that 
earnings capture economic losses after investors have already impounded the information in 
price.23  Our findings in Column (3) therefore simply suggest that measurement rules underlying 
performance covenant earnings exclude items in GAAP earnings that accelerate the recognition 
of expected future losses to time periods when investors become aware of these expected losses.  
																																																						
23 For example, expected decline in future sales from a product might lead to negative stock returns and an asset 
write-down (related to manufacturing equipment) in GAAP earnings today.  However, these losses would manifest 
in an earnings measure that excludes asset write-downs only in the future when the firm actually experiences 
declining sales. 
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In addition, while we find no evidence of a contemporaneous relation between 
performance covenant earnings and economic losses for our sample, in a subsequent analysis 
(section 6) we find evidence of such a relation on the larger sample when we do the analysis 
using OIBDP as a proxy for performance covenant earnings. Specifically, we find that OIBDP 
exhibits asymmetric gain timeliness, but the coefficient on the interaction term is not large 
enough to eliminate the relation between OIBDP and negative stock returns. This difference in 
findings could arise because of differences in sample composition or because OIBDP is not a 
perfect proxy for PERF COV EARNINGS, but we do not attempt to disentangle the cause 
because the coefficient is not of primary concern in our study. Accordingly, we caution that our 
findings should not be interpreted as suggesting there is no contemporaneous relation between 
earnings and negative stock returns in the broad cross-section of firms.  
5.3 Cash Flow Predictive Ability Tests 
 We next examine the possibility that earnings used in debt contracts are tailored to 
achieve an earnings metric that better reflects borrowers’ ability to generate future cash flows. 
We model the cash flow predictive ability of different earnings measures using the following 
specification: 
	 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊!!! = 𝛾! + 𝛾!𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑆! + 𝜖!!!,	 (2) 	
in which CASH FLOWt+4 is the rolling annual operating cash flow for the four-quarter period 
ending at t+4 and EARNINGSt  is the rolling annual earnings measure for the four-quarter period 
ending at t. Both CASHFLOW and EARNINGS are scaled by total assets at the end of the period. 
We are primarily interested in the adjusted R-squared of this regression, which captures the 
ability of the earnings measure to predict cash flows one year in the future.  
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 Table 7 presents the results of this analysis. Estimates in the first two columns show that 
the coefficient estimates on NET INCOME and EBITDA are 0.353 and 0.347 respectively, and 
both estimates are significantly different from zero at less than 1% level. These estimates suggest 
that NET INCOME and EBITDA map into future cash flow similarly: a $1 innovation in NET 
INCOME (EBITDA) at time t on average results in a $0.35 ($0.35) increase in operating cash 
flow at t+4. The adjusted  R-square in the first column is 0.206, while the adjusted R-square in 
the second column is 0.243. In the third column, we examine the variable of interest, PERF COV 
EARNINGS. The point estimate of 𝛾! in the third column is 0.664 (t-statistics=11.72), indicating 
that the earnings employed in performance-based covenants map into future cash flows at 
approximately twice the rate as the GAAP-based earnings measures examined in the first two 
columns. More importantly, the R-square is 0.364, which is the highest of the three columns, and 
is about 77% greater than that of the first column in which NET INCOME was used as the 
earnings variable. In the last row of the table we compare the difference in R-square of the PERF 
COV EARNINGS model with the R-square in the NET INCOME model and the EBITDA model 
using the Vuong’s (1989) test. As can be seen, the Z-statistic is greater than five in both cases, 
and highly statistically significant. These findings show that PERF COV EARNINGS have 
significantly greater cash flow predictive ability than FASB GAAP earnings.  
5.4 Discussion of Results 
The above analyses reveal marked differences between the informational properties of 
earnings used in performance covenants and the properties of FASB GAAP earnings. The 
findings suggest that the contractual adjustments made to NET INCOME result in an earnings 
metric that exhibits asymmetric gain timeliness and has significantly greater cash flow predictive 
ability than NET INCOME. 
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Our findings regarding asymmetric gain timeliness are consistent with the arguments in 
Leuz et al. (2001), Gigler et al. (2009), and Lambert (2010), who suggest that whether 
conditional conservatism benefits debt contracting parties depends on the relative costs of the 
two decision errors affected by reducing the verifiability threshold of losses relative to gains. 
While reducing the verifiability threshold for loss recognition facilitates timelier creditor 
intervention by reducing the incidence of “false negatives”, it also increases the incidence of 
“false positives” triggered by noisy losses that are not indicative of borrowers’ future prospects. 
As discussed in Section 3, Gigler et al. (2009) show that when the role of accounting information 
is to facilitate monitoring of a positive NPV project that has already been financed, expected 
costs of false positives dominate the benefits of timelier intervention, thus rendering liberal 
accounting beneficial for writing debt contracts. Our findings suggest that when it comes to 
performance covenants, debt contracting parties view the benefits of timelier intervention to be 
dominated by the costs of “false positives” that result from the use of a conditionally 
conservative earnings measure. These results also lend support to the conjecture in Skinner 
(2011) who notes that the costs of monitoring and enforcing covenants are perhaps much higher 
than typically assumed.  
Consistent with the arguments in Li (2010), our findings also suggest that earnings items 
that are not predictive of future cash flows are relatively less useful for periodic performance 
measurement in debt contracts and, thus, are excluded from performance covenants. This result 
also supports Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), who argue that, unlike capital covenants that 
rarely get violated, the role of performance covenants is to serve as tripwires and allocate 
decision rights to lenders when borrower performance starts deteriorating.  They argue that 
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performance covenants, therefore, are more likely to be based on earnings metric that is forward 
looking and better indicates borrowers’ future prospects.24   
6.  Additional Tests 
6.1 How generalizable are our inferences? 
In this section, we conduct a variety of analyses to show that our inferences are 
generalizable to the broader sample of borrowers with performance covenants in their debt 
contracts. 
6.1.1 Comparison of definitions of contractual earnings for disclosers and non-disclosers  
 We first compare the contractual definitions of performance covenant earnings for our 
sample firms with those of a matched sample of control firms that do not disclose the realization 
of contractual earnings. Presence of similar types of contractual adjustments to net income in the 
definitions for both set of firms would indicate that their informational properties are also likely 
to be similar. We match each of our sample firms to a control firm based on size, industry, and 
the year the contract became effective. We then manually search for the debt contract for each of 
our sample firms and each of our control firms. We were successful in identifying contracts for 
90 firms in our sample and 79 control firms. We then use a taxonomy similar to the one in Li 
(2016) to identify the key types of adjustments in the definitions. Specifically, we create 
indicator variables for the presence of following 7 types of exclusions from GAAP Net Income 
in the contractual definitions: (i) taxes, (ii) interest, (iii) depreciation and amortization, (iv) 
extraordinary items, (v) discontinued operations, (vi) non-cash adjustments, including write 
																																																						
24 We note that many contractual adjustments are likely to simultaneously affect both the asymmetric timeliness and 
the cash flow predictive ability of earnings used in performance covenants. As such, our findings should be used 
cautiously in making inferences about the desirability of any one particular statistical property in isolation. That is, 
we cannot separate whether adjustments are made to improve cash flow predictive ability and asymmetric timeliness 
is altered as a byproduct, or vice versa, and researchers should appropriately consider this caveat when drawing 
inferences. 
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downs and impairments, and (vii) nonrecurring items, including asset sales. We use a computer 
program that relies on key word searches to identify the presence of each type of adjustment. We 
identify these key words by carefully reading the contractual definitions for 50 random debt 
contracts. We also spot-checked the computer program by hand searching a subsample, and 
found that the computer program was nearly 100% accurate.  
Table 8 presents the results. The evidence indicates that disclosers and non-disclosers 
exhibit a nearly identical distribution of all 7 kinds of contractual adjustments with the disclosing 
firms exhibiting an average of 5.68 adjustments compared an average of 5.71 adjustments for the 
control firms. The differences in the propensity to make adjustments are not statistically 
significant across the two samples for all 7 categories of adjustments. The above analysis 
demonstrates that, as assessed by the definitions, the contractual tailoring done to derive the 
definition of performance covenant earnings for our sample firms is very similar to the tailoring 
done in the contracts of non-disclosing firms.  
6.1.2 Large sample evidence using OIBDP as a proxy for performance covenant earnings 
 In this analysis we directly provide large sample evidence on the informational properties 
of performance covenant earnings by using Compustat item “operating income before 
depreciation” (OIBDP) as our proxy for performance covenants earnings.  This analysis is based 
on Demerjian and Owen (2015) who suggest that OIBDP is a good proxy for the earnings 
measure used in performance covenants.  
We first examine how closely OIBDP approximates the informational properties of 
performance covenant earnings.  First, in unreported results, we find that OIBDP and PERF 
COV EARNINGS are highly correlated (88% Spearman correlation). Second, in the two columns 
of Table 9, Panel A we compare the asymmetric loss timeliness of PERF COV EARNINGS to 
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the asymmetric loss timeliness of OIBDP, and find that using OIBDP as the earnings measure 
yields coefficient estimates that are very similar to the coefficient estimates when we use PERF 
COV EARNINGS, suggesting OIBDP is a good proxy for PERF COV EARNINGS in asymmetric 
timely loss recognition tests. Moving to the third column of Panel A, we repeat the test using all 
firms in Dealscan with performance covenants in their debt contracts. Consistent with our small 
sample results, OIBDP exhibits asymmetric gain timeliness for the larger sample of Dealscan 
firms.   
Third, in the first two columns of Table 9, Panel B, we compare the cash flow predictive 
ability of PERF COV EARNINGS to OIBDP, and find that the adjusted R-square values are very 
similar, suggesting OIBDP is a good proxy for PERF COV EARNINGNS in the cash flow 
predictive ability tests. Moving to the third column of Panel B, we repeat the tests using all firms 
in Dealscan with performance covenants in their debt contracts. We find that the adjusted R-
square statistic for all Dealscan firms is very similar to our small sample of firms. 25 These 
analyses provide compelling evidence that our inferences are likely to generalize to the broader 
sample of borrowers captured by the Dealscan database.  
6.1.3 Other tests to address selection issues 
We conduct four additional analyses to further address concerns about the 
generalizability of our findings. First, we attempt to explicitly adjust for any self-selection biases 
using multiple imputation analysis. Multiple imputation is a method developed in statistical 
literature (e.g., Rubin, 1987; Little and Rubin, 2002; McKnight et al., 2007) to mitigate selection 
biases resulting from missing data by generating simulated values for the missing variable. The 
simulated values are generated using an imputation model that utilizes information from 
																																																						
25 In unreported tests, we find that the adjusted R-square value for OIBDP is statistically and economically larger 
than the adjusted R-square value when NET INCOME or EBITDA is used as the independent variable. 
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observable variables to generate simulated values for the missing variables. Details of this 
analysis are available in the Appendix B of the paper. We find that adjusting for selection biases 
using the multiple imputation method makes little difference to our inferences.  
Second, we compare the properties of GAAP net income of our sample firms to that of 
the broader sample of firms that have a performance covenant in their debt. If the properties of 
GAAP net income for our sample our systematically different from the properties for the larger 
sample then it could be that our sample firms need to make systematically different contractual 
adjustments to arrive at the desirable performance covenants earnings. In this scenario, 
differences in the properties of GAAP net income and performance covenant earnings that we 
document for our sample may not generalize to the broader sample. Table 10, Panel A presents 
the results for asymmetric timeliness and Panel B presents the results for cash flow predictive 
ability. Panel A shows that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient of our sample firms is 0.337, 
compared to 0.391 for Dealscan firms and the difference is not significantly different from zero. 
Similarly, in Panel B the R-squared for NET INCOME in regressions of future cash flows is 0.20 
for our sample firms compared to 0.15 for the Dealscan firms.26 The results indicate that the 
FASB GAAP earnings of Dealscan firms exhibit levels of conservatism and cash flow predictive 
ability that are similar to that of our sample firms, mitigating concerns about the generalizability 
of our findings.  
Third, we further investigate self-selection concerns by examining whether the decision 
to disclose contractual earnings for our sample firms was triggered by changes in informational 
properties of GAAP earnings. In almost all cases, our sample firms have GAAP earnings data in 
quarters before they start disclosing PERF COV EARNINGS. Results from these tests are 
																																																						
26 We are unable to provide statistical tests of difference in r-square for this analysis because the Vuong (1989) test 
is designed for non-nested models. 
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presented in Table 11. In Panel A, we compare asymmetric timeliness of our sample firms during 
the pre-disclosure period to asymmetric timeliness during the post-disclosure period. The pre-
disclosure period includes all years for which data on required variables is available in 
Compustat and CRSP databases. Of primary interest is the coefficient on the interaction term, 
RETURN*D. We find that the difference in asymmetric loss timeliness of NET INCOME and 
EBITDA is not statistically significant for our sample firms in the pre-disclosure period 
compared to the disclosure period. In Panel B, we find the cash flow predictive ability of NET 
INCOME for our sample firms in the pre-disclosure period (R-square=0.196) to be nearly 
identical to that in the disclosure period (R-square=0.206). The results are also similar for 
EBITDA with R-square of 0.208 in the pre-disclosure period compared to R-square of 0.243 in 
the disclosure period. These findings suggest that the firms’ decision to disclose PERF COV 
EARNINGS was unlikely to have been triggered by any changes in informational properties of 
GAAP earnings. 
Finally we examine if the decision to disclose PERF COV EARNINGS was triggered by 
signing of new contracts or by making amendments to existing contracts. To test this, we 
examine the contract initiation dates for each firm in our sample, specifically focusing on the 
contract that was effective when the first voluntary disclosure of PERF COV EARNINGS was 
made. We are able to identify the effective contract dates for 118 of our 128 firms. Of these 118 
firms, only 24 (about 20%) signed contracts (or amendments to contracts) that became effective 
in the 90 days leading up to the first voluntary disclosure. More than 25% of our sample had over 
500 days between the contract date and the first voluntary disclosure. The mean number of days 
between most recent contract and first voluntary disclosure is about one year. Thus, it does not 
appear that firms are choosing to disclose because of changes to the terms of the debt contract. 
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6.2. Comparing performance covenant earnings to pro-forma I/B/E/S earnings  
In our final set of analyses we exploit our data to compare the informational properties of 
performance covenant earnings to the properties of pro forma non-GAAP earnings measures that 
firms disclose and emphasize to analysts. Such an analysis would shed light on how the 
informational demands of analysts/equity investors might differ from those of debt contracting 
parties for periodic performance measurement in earnings based financial covenants. We use the 
earnings measure used by IBES in reporting to analysts as a proxy for the pro forma earnings 
measure firms typically use to report to analysts. Several prior studies in the pro-forma literature 
use IBES earnings as a proxy for pro-forma earnings (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Doyle et 
al., 2003).27 Results in Table 12 show that although IBES earnings exhibit asymmetric loss 
timeliness, the magnitude of the asymmetry is lower than that of NET INCOME.  We also find 
that IBES earnings are a significantly better predictor of future cash flows compared to NET 
INCOME, but this predictive ability is not as good as that of performance covenant earnings.  
Overall the above analyses show that similar to performance covenant earnings, 
adjustments made to derive pro forma earnings tend to increase cash flow predictive ability and 
undo asymmetric loss timeliness in GAAP net income. The properties of pro forma earnings are 
therefore closer to that of performance covenant earnings, but significant differences remain: 
specifically, pro forma earnings continue to exhibit asymmetric loss timeliness and have lower 
																																																						
27 In untabulated analyses we confirm that IBES earnings are indeed a good proxy for the actual pro forma earnings 
measures. We obtain a large hand-collected dataset of the actual pro forma earnings measures released by firms in 
earnings press releases that has been used in prior research (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). The overlap of this pro-forma 
dataset with our sample is limited to 2 firms, so we cannot directly compare the properties of this data to contractual 
earnings in our sample, but we use this dataset to check how closely can IBES earnings approximate the properties 
of actual pro forma earnings. We find that pro-forma earnings are 97% correlated with IBES actual earnings. We 
also find that disclosed pro-forma earnings exhibit asymmetric loss timeliness, and that the pro-forma asymmetric 
loss timeliness is not statistically different from the asymmetric loss timeliness of IBES actual earnings. Finally we 
find that the cash flow predictive ability of pro-forma earnings is similar to IBES actual earnings. Thus, from this 
analysis we conclude that pro-forma earnings, as voluntarily disclosed, are very much similar to IBES actual 
earnings. 
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cash flow predictive ability than performance covenant earnings. These findings illustrate that 
there are significant differences in the desirable properties of the earnings measure for disclosure 
to analysts and for periodic performance measurement in earnings based covenants in debt 
contracts.  
7.  Conclusion 
Which properties of accounting earnings are desirable for writing debt contracts remains 
a subject of considerable debate. Several studies argue that because lenders care more about 
downside risk, conservative accounting numbers facilitate writing of debt contracts by allowing 
for a timely transfer of control to banks when borrower performance starts deteriorating. Others 
argue that earnings numbers that are less affected by transitory items and that are more predictive 
of future cash flows are better for writing debt contracts. Gigler et al. (2009) even argue that 
asymmetric timely recognition of bad news in contractual performance measures can reduce the 
efficiency of debt contracts. We inform this debate by providing the first direct evidence on the 
informational properties of contractual earnings actually employed in debt contracts. Under the 
assumption that observed contractual accounting rules reflect optimal arrangements, this 
evidence sheds light on the desirable informational properties of accounting numbers for debt 
contracting. 
We find marked differences in the informational properties of earnings underlying 
performance covenants and FASB GAAP earnings. We find that performance covenant earnings 
are significantly better at predicting future cash flows and are significantly less conservative than 
GAAP earnings. Our findings about conservatism appear consistent with the arguments in Leuz 
(2001), Gigler et al. (2009), and Lambert (2010) and suggest that when it comes to performance 
covenant earnings, benefits of timelier creditor intervention facilitated by conditionally 
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conservative earnings are dominated by the increased costs of false alarms triggered by noisy 
losses that are not indicative of future performance. We leave it for future researchers to 
investigate the specific nature of these costs. Our results also lend support to the arguments in Li 
(2010), who suggests that earnings items that are not predictive of future performance are 
relatively less useful for periodic performance measurement in debt contracts.  
Our findings stand in contrast to prior work that attempts to indirectly infer the desirable 
informational properties for debt contracting purposes by examining the properties of FASB 
GAAP earnings. A maintained assumption in this literature is that the design of FASB GAAP is 
significantly influenced by the demands of debt contracting parties, and thus one can infer the 
properties of earnings used in debt contracts by examining the properties of FASB GAAP 
earnings. The differences we observe in the properties of earnings used in performance 
covenants as defined in bank contracts and FASB GAAP earnings, highlights the limitations of 
making inferences about desirable properties of accounting numbers for debt contracts using 
FASB GAAP.  
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Appendix A 
Example of contractual definitions of Net Income as compared to Adjusted Ebitda. 
 
The information below presents the contractual definition of Consolidated Net Income and 
Adjusted EBITDA from Xerium Technologies credit agreement dated May 18, 2005. The credit 
agreement can be found here: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1287151/000119312505130023/dex101.htm 
 
“Consolidated Net Income” means, with respect to any Person for any period, the aggregate of 
the net income (loss) of such Person and its Subsidiaries for such period determined on a 
consolidated basis in accordance with GAAP; provided, however, that the following, without 
duplication, shall be excluded in determining Consolidated Net Income: (i) any net after-tax 
extraordinary or non-recurring gains, losses or expenses (less all fees and expenses relating 
thereto), (ii) the cumulative effect of changes in accounting principles, (iii) [intentionally 
omitted] and (iv) any gains resulting from the returned surplus assets of any Pension Plan or 
Canadian Registered Pension Plan; and provided, further that, without duplication, (x) the net 
income for such period of any Person that is not a Subsidiary of such Person or that is accounted 
for by the equity method of accounting shall be included only to the extent of the amount of 
dividends or distributions or other payments paid in cash (or to the extent converted into cash) to 
such Person or a wholly-owned Subsidiary thereof in respect of such period (and if such net 
income is a loss it will be included only to the extent such loss has been funded with cash by 
such Person or a wholly-owned Subsidiary thereof in respect of such period), and (y) the net 
income (loss) for such period of any Subsidiary shall be excluded to the extent that the 
declaration or payment of dividends or similar distributions by such Subsidiary of its net income 
is not at the date of determination permitted without any prior governmental approval (which has 
not been obtained and which is not expected by Xerium to be obtained in the Ordinary Course) 
or, directly or indirectly, by the operation of the terms of its charter or any agreement, 
instrument, judgment, decree, order, statute, rule or governmental regulation applicable to that 
Subsidiary or its stockholders (other than any loan agreement or similar agreement which 
restricts the payment of dividends or similar distributions upon the occurrence of or during the 
existence or continuance of a default or event of default), unless such restrictions with respect to 
the payment of dividends or in similar distributions have been legally waived and except that this 
clause (y) shall not apply to any Subsidiary that is also a Guarantor in the calculation of 
Xerium’s Leverage Ratio.  
 
 
“Adjusted EBITDA” means, with respect to any Person for any period, the total of (A) the 
Consolidated Net Income of such Person and its Subsidiaries for such period, plus (B), without 
duplication, to the extent that any of the following were deducted in computing such 
Consolidated Net Income for such period: (i) provision for taxes based on income or profits, (ii) 
Consolidated Interest Expense, (iii) Consolidated Depreciation and Amortization Expense, (iv) 
reserves for inventory in connection with plant closures, (v) Consolidated Restructuring Costs, 
(vi) any non-cash gains or losses resulting from marking-to-market Hedging Obligations, (vii) 
any expense or loss associated with (A) any proposed or completed equity or debt financing on 
or prior to the Closing Date and (B) the early retirement, extinguishment or refinancing of debt 
including bonuses paid with respect to the completion of any of the foregoing, (viii) any fees, 
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expenses or charges deducted in computing Consolidated Net Income which have been 
determined by management of Xerium, which determination is reasonably acceptable to the 
Administrative Agent, to be non-recurring by virtue of changes in Xerium’s method of 
operations pursuant to its cost reduction programs, (ix) Consolidated Transaction Costs, (x) non-
cash charges resulting from the application of purchase accounting, (xi) non-cash compensation 
charges, including any such charges arising from stock options, restricted stock grants or other 
equity-incentive programs or from the forgiveness of loans made to employees in connection 
with the purchase of equity and related tax gross-up payments made in cash in connection with 
the IPO or on or prior to the Closing Date, (xii) non cash expenses resulting from the granting of 
stock options, restricted stock or restricted stock unit awards under equity compensation 
programs solely with respect to Common Stock, and (xiii) expenses incurred as a result of the 
repurchase, redemption or retention by Xerium of Common Stock earned under equity 
compensation programs solely in order to make withholding tax payments. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, taxes paid and provision for taxes based on the income or profits of, and the 
Consolidated Depreciation and Amortization Expense of, a Subsidiary of such Person shall be 
added to Consolidated Net Income of such Person to compute Adjusted EBITDA only to the 
extent (and in the same proportion) that the Consolidated Net Income of such Subsidiary was 
included in calculating Consolidated Net Income of such Person. 
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Extracted Portion of Xerium Technologies’ Adjusted EBITDA Disclosure included in their financial statements 
 
	Xerium Technologies discloses the following discussion in their 9/30/2009 10Q (pp53) and related 8K which is a press release 
discussing the earnings announcement:  
 
“EBITDA is defined as net income (loss) before interest expense, income tax provision (benefit) and depreciation (including non-cash 
impairment charges) and amortization. Adjusted EBITDA is defined in our credit facility and is EBITDA plus (i) restructuring or 
related impairment costs (not to exceed $5.0 million in the aggregate for 2008 and in each year thereafter, (ii) reserves for inventory in 
connection with plant closings, (iii) stock-based and other non-cash compensation charges……(omitted for parsimony).   
 
Adjusted EBITDA, as defined in the credit facility and calculated below, may not be comparable to similarly titled measurements used 
by other companies.” 
 
	
 
The exhibit can be accessed here: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1287151/000119312509225946/dex993.htm. 
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Comparisons of Adjusted EBITDA Reconciliations with Compustat Data 
 
Xerium Technologies  
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1287151/000119312509225946/dex993.htm) 
 
 
 
 
  
Xerium	Technologies,	Inc. Q3	2008 Compustat Notes
Net	income	(loss) 21,536	 21,536							
Income	tax	provision	(benefit) 794							 794													
Interest	expense,	net 16,230	 16,963							 "Interest	and	Related	Expenses"
Depreciation	and	amortization 11,738	 11,738							
EBITDA 50,298	 51,031							 Computed
Unrealized	foreign	exchange	gain	on	revaluation	of	debt -													
Amendment/termination	costs 483							 Not	on	Compustat
Change	in	fair	value	of	interest	rate	swaps 450							 Not	on	Compustat
Changes	in	value	of	other	derivatives -													
Restructuring	expenses 1,817				 3,612										 "Restructuring	Cost	Pretax"
Inventory	write-offs	under	restructuring	programs 199							
Growth	program	costs -													
Non-cash	compensation	and	related	expenses 500							 500													 "Stock	Compensation	Expense"
Non-cash	impairment	charges 405							
Non-recurring	expenses	resulting	from	cost	reduction	programs -													
Adjusted	EBITDA* 54,152	 13,232							 "Operating	Income	Before	Depreciation"
*The	discrepency	between	Adjusted	EBITDA	and	OIBDPQ	is	primarily	because	compustat	classifies	36,356	as	"special	items"
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Appendix B: Multiple Imputation Analysis 
 
Multiple imputation is a method developed in statistical literature to mitigate biases 
caused by missing data on some variables (e.g., Rubin, 1987; Little and Rubin, 2002; McKnight 
et al., 2007). Multiple imputation is a Monte Carlo technique in which missing values are 
replaced with m simulated values. Each of the m simulated datasets is then analyzed separately 
by the method appropriate for the investigation at hand, and the parameter estimates are then 
combined appropriately to produce the final set of results. Rubin (1987) (see also Schafer (1999) 
for a more concise description) describes the rules and techniques that could be used for 
combining parameter estimates from the simulated datasets for making appropriate inferences. 
The ability of the multiple imputation analysis to mitigate biases depends crucially on the 
quality of imputation model used for generating the simulated values. The imputation model 
utilizes information from observable variables to generate simulated values for the missing 
variables. The imputation model allows for generating complete simulated datasets that preserve 
important features of the joint distribution among observable variables (means, variances, 
covariances). To effectively mitigate selection biases it is important to include (in addition to the 
variables directly used in the analysis) in the imputation model auxiliary variables that are 
expected to determine or are correlated with the incidence of missingness (Collins, Schafer, and 
Kam, 2001). Therefore, in addition to the variables that are directly required for analysis in cash 
flow regressions and asymmetric loss timeliness tests, we include in our imputation models all of 
the variables that we use in the disclosure choice model described in Section 4. 
 Our coefficient estimates for the conditional conservatism tests for this analysis are based 
on combination rules specified in Rubin (1987) for combining coefficient estimates on covariates 
obtained from multiple simulated datasets. In the cash flow predictive ability analysis the 
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parameter of interest is the R-squared from the regressions. Harel (2009) describes the 
appropriate procedures that could be used to combine estimates of R-squareds and adjusted R-
squareds from simulated datasets. Specifically, Harel's method is to first estimate the model and 
calculate the R2 and/or adjusted R2 in each of the imputed datasets. Each model R2 is then 
transformed into a correlation (r) by taking its square-root. Fisher's r to z transformation is then 
used to transform each of the r values into a z value. The average z across the imputations can 
then be calculated. Finally, the mean of the z values is transformed back into an R2. We use the 
“MI” procedure in the STATA software to conduct the multiple imputation analysis. We use a 
regression based multiple imputation model. Finally, we use five imputations for our analysis 
based on prior work that suggests that five imputations may be sufficient to obtain valid 
inferences (Schafer and Olsen, 1998; Van Buuren et al., 1999). 
We find that adjusting for self-selection bias using the multiple imputation method makes 
little difference to our inferences. Table B1 presents the analysis for asymmetric loss timeliness 
tests. It can be seen that PERF COV EARNINGS continues to exhibit asymmetric gain timeliness 
(Coefficient on RETURN*D=-0.364; t-stat=6.35). Estimates in Table B2 show that PERF COV 
EARNINGS continues to exhibit significantly greater cash flow predictive ability than both NET 
INCOME and EBITDA. Specifically, the r-square in the PERF COV EARNNIGS model is 0.418, 
which is more than double the value in the NET INCOME model, and about 45 percent larger 
than the value in the EBITDA model. 
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Appendix B - Table B1 
Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition Analysis Using Multiple Imputations 
	
	
 
Notes: This table presents the asymmetric timeliness analysis using a multiple imputation method in which we 
replace missing values of PERF COV EARNINGS using a regression based imputation model. The estimates were 
generated using the “mi” procedure in STATA software using 5 imputations.  Additional details about the 
implementation of the multiple imputation procedure including the description of the variables used in the 
imputation model are available in Appendix B.  
PERF COV 
EARNINGS t
INTERCEPT 0.042***             0.141***             0.083***             
(20.63) (38.68) (9.64)
RETURN 0.002             0.127***             0.239***             
(0.51) (14.01) (13.46)
D 0.010***             0.028***             0.039**             
(3.27) (6.55) (2.32)
RETURN * D 0.252***             0.095***             -0.364***           
(17.08) (5.29) (-6.35)
N 34,493 34,493 34,493
ADJRSQ 0.068             0.094             0.134             
Test of: RETURN + RETURN*D 0.254***             0.222***             -0.125***           
(18.55) (14.79) (-2.79)
NET INCOME t EBITDA 
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Appendix B - Table B2 
Cash Flow Prediction Analysis Using multiple Imputations 
 
	Notes: This table presents the cash prediction analysis using a multiple imputation method in which we replace 
missing values of PERF COV EARNINGS using a regression based imputation model. The estimates were generated 
using the “mi” procedure in STATA software using 5 imputations.  Additional details about the implementation of 
the multiple imputation procedure including the description of the variables used in the imputation model are 
available in Appendix B.  
NET 
INCOME t EBITDA t
PERF COV 
EARNINGS t
INTERCEPT 0.097***          0.058***          -0.012         
(223.94) (99.95) (-0.17)
EARNINGS VARIABLE 0.376***          0.424***          0.841***          
(79.46) (113.20) (17.75)
N 32,538 32,538 32,534
ADJRSQ 0.162          0.283          0.418          
EARNINGS VARIABLE
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Notes: The initial sample was selected by searching 10-K and 10-Q filings of publicly traded firms using the Lexis 
Nexis search engine for keywords related to bank earnings. The primary search formula was the following: ebitda 
w/2 (defined or adjusted or bank) w/20 (credit w/2 agreement). This search was supplemented with searches for the 
phrases “credit agreement ebitda,” “ebitda as defined,” “bank defined cash flow,” “trailing twelve months,” and 
“covenant cushion” “ebitda w/20 reconcil.*” The search resulted in 150 firms that matched with Compustat and 
reported annualized PERF COV EARNINGS in at least one quarter. In the table, Compustat data pnemonics are 
provided in all caps inside parentheses. Compustat variables are annualized using quarterly data in rolling four-
quarter windows to be consistent with the majority of disclosed PERF COV EARNINGS numbers, which are 
frequently reported as annualized values using rolling four-quarter windows. TOTAL ASSETS is the Compustat data 
item ATQ observed in the fourth quarter of each rolling four-quarter window. 
Criteria N Firms N Obs
Observations identified with annualized PERF COV EARNINGS 
disclosed in at least one quarter 150 2,200
Drop observations missing annualized values of NET INCOME t 
(NIQ), EBITDA t   (NI + DPQ + XINTQ + TXTQ or TOTAL ASSETS t  
(ATQ) 135 1,892
Drop observations missing annualized values of CASH FLOW t+1 
(OANCFY) 130 1,811
Truncate PERF COV EARNINGS t , EBITDA t ,  NET INCOME t , and  
CASH FLOW t+1  at the 1st and 99th percentiles 128 1,721
Require RETURN t and  MARKET VALUE OF EQUTY t+1 98 1,152
Subsample with Market Returns for Asymmetric Timeliness Tests
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Table 2 
Industry Composition and other firm characteristics 
 
Panel A: Overall Industry Distribution 
 
 
Notes: The table shows the distribution of firms across industries as defined in Barth et al. (2005).  
Industries from Barth et al. (2005)
Sample 
Firms
% of 
Sample 
Firms
Dealscan 
Firms
% of 
Dealscan 
Firms
BUILDING MATERIALS 6 5% 90 2%
CHEMICALS 3 2 104 3
COMPUTERS 9 7 417 11
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 4 3 121 3
EXTRACTIVE 5 4 238 6
FOOD 2 2 102 3
INSTRUMENTS 3 2 160 4
MACHINERY 8 6 138 4
METAL 3 2 121 3
MISC. MANUFACTURING 2 2 39 1
MISC. RETAIL 7 5 253 7
OTHER 25 20 868 23
PHARMA 1 1 81 2
RESTAURANTS 6 5 81 2
SERVICES 25 20 446 12
TEXTILES 8 6 234 6
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 6 5 81 2
WHOLESALE 5 4 167 4
TOTAL 128 100% 3,741 100%
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Table 2 (continued) 
Industry Composition and other firm characteristics 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics – Main Sample 
 Notes: 
Notes: The panel compares basic descriptive statistics of sample firms and Dealscan firms. * represents statistical 
difference between the two samples at the 5% level or better. 
 
 
 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics– Asymmetric Timeliness Sample 
 
Notes: The panel compares basic descriptive statistics of sample firms and Dealscan firms. * represents statistical 
difference between the two samples at the 5% level or better. 
 
  
Variable Sample Dealscan Sample Dealscan Sample Dealscan Sample Dealscan
NET INCOME t 1,721 77,930 0.006* 0.021 0.069 0.097 0.015 0.035
EBITDA t 1,721 77,930 0.104* 0.110 0.077 0.107 0.106 0.115
CASH FLOW t+1 1,721 77,930 0.079* 0.098 0.054 0.081 0.074 0.090
LOG ASSETS t 1,721 77,930 7.485* 6.871 1.386 1.677 7.379 6.854
LOG MVE t 1,246 73,206 6.584* 6.453 1.639 1.945 6.767 6.603
LEVERAGE t 1,702 77,181 0.515* 0.307 0.251 0.222 0.503 0.279
BOOK to MARKET t 1,223 72,008 0.407* 0.647 1.233 0.685 0.440 0.519
N Mean StdDev Median
Variable Sample Dealscan Sample Dealscan Sample Dealscan Sample Dealscan
NET INCOME t 1,152 73,403 -0.024* -0.003 0.332 0.240 0.054 0.049
EBITDA t 1,152 73,403 0.258* 0.168 0.364 0.304 0.197 0.143
RETURN t 1,152 73,403 0.155 0.138 0.539 0.523 0.091 0.080
D (RETURN t < 0 ) 1,152 73,403 0.415 0.420 0.493 0.494 0.000 0.000
LOG ASSETS t 1,152 73,403 7.242* 6.842 1.288 1.666 7.278 6.836
LOG MVE t 1,152 73,353 6.635 6.546 1.580 1.849 6.786 6.656
LEVERAGE t 1,134 72,938 0.433* 0.284 0.213 0.204 0.407 0.261
BOOK to MARKET t 1,141 72,929 0.510* 0.641 0.925 0.642 0.462 0.516
N Mean StdDev Median
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Table 3 
Disclosure Model 
 
		
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm disclosed PERF COV EARNINGS, 
and zero otherwise. The model is a probit. The sample is comprised of all firms in the Dealscan database that have at 
least one performance covenant, and have sufficient Compustat data to compute the explanatory variables. The 
explanatory variables include: (i) firm size measured as the natural logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE); 
(ii) book leverage measured as total debt scaled by total assets (LEV); (iii) book-to-market ratio measured as book 
value of equity scaled by market value of equity (BM); (iv) annual stock return (RET); (v) net income scaled by 
assets (ROA); (vi) analyst forecast dispersion (STDEVU); (vii) analyst following (QTRNUMEST); (viii) lagged cash 
flow predictive ability of GAAP net income (RSQ5) measured as the adjusted r-square from firm-specific 
regressions of one year ahead operating cash flows on net income using five quarters of data, with the last quarter 
ending one year before end of quarter t; (ix) annual sales growth (DSALE);  (x) an indicator variable for whether or 
not the firm had negative net income (LOSS); and (xi) industry fixed effects using the industry classification from 
Barth et al. (2005) ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm.   
INTERCEPT -3.160***    
(-6.48)
SIZE 0.032     
(0.54)
LEV 1.450***     
(5.35)
BM 0.119     
(1.30)
RET -0.004    
(-0.08)
ROA -22.134
(-0.33)
STDEVU 0.075     
(0.18)
QTRNUMEST 0.004     
(0.30)
RSQ5 -0.080*    
(-1.77)
DSALE -0.189    
(-1.16)
LOSS -0.250**    
(-1.99)
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES
N 31,107
PSEUDO RSQ 0.095     
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Table 4 
Simple Statistics 
 
Panel A: Main Sample 
 
Notes: The sample selection procedure is provided in Table 1. NET INCOMEt is the rolling four-quarter sum of net 
income (NI) ending in quarter t. EBITDAt is the rolling four-quarter sum of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (NI + XINTQ + DPQ + TXTQ) ending in quarter t. PERF COV EARNINGSt is the 
annual earnings required by the bank lending agreement ending in quarter t. OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1 is cash 
flow from operations (OANCF) one year in the future. NET INCOMEt, EBITDAt, PERF COV EARNINGSt, and 
OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1 are scaled by assets at the end of the period. EBITDA to PERF COV EARNINGS is 
the ratio of EBITDAt to PERF COV EARNINGSt. NET INCOME to PERF COV EARNINGSt is the ratio of NET 
INCOMEt to PERF COV EARNINGSt.  
 
Panel B: Subsample for Asymmetric Timeliness Tests 
 
Notes: The sample selection procedure is described in Table 1. NET INCOMEt is the rolling four-quarter sum of net 
income (NI) ending in quarter t. EBITDAt is the rolling four-quarter sum of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (NI + XINTQ + DPQ + TXTQ) ending in quarter t. PERF COV EARNINGSt is annual 
earnings required by the bank lending agreement ending in quarter t. NET INCOMEt, EBITDAt, and PERF COV 
EARNINGSt are scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. RETURNt is the annual market 
return corresponding to the four fiscal quarters ending in quarter t. 
 
 
  
Variable N Mean Std Min P25 P50 P75 Max
NET INCOME to PERF COV EARNINGS 1,721 -0.038 0.672 - 6.884 - 0.164 0.129 0.325 1.450
EBITDA to PERF COV EARNINGS 1,721 0.757 0.610 - 5.604 0.704 0.899 0.978 3.368
NET INCOME t 1,721 0.006 0.069 -0.394 -0.018 0.015 0.048 0.169
EBITDA t 1,721 0.104 0.077 -0.303 0.072 0.106 0.146 0.374
PERF COV EARNINGS t 1,721 0.132 0.049 0.027 0.099 0.125 0.160 0.389
CASH FLOW t+1 1,721 0.079 0.054 -0.047 0.041 0.074 0.112 0.278
Variable N Mean Std Min P25 P50 P75 Max
NET INCOME t 1,152 -0.024 0.332 -3.442 0.006 0.054 0.082 0.410
EBITDA t 1,152 0.258 0.364 -1.606 0.131 0.197 0.308 3.954
PERF COV EARNINGS t 1,152 0.329 0.352 0.040 0.162 0.230 0.349 4.148
RETURN t 1,152 0.155 0.539 -0.859 -0.178 0.091 0.427 3.343
D (RETURN t < 0 ) 1,152 0.415 0.493 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 5 
Spearman Correlations 
 
Panel A: Main Sample  
 
Notes: The sample selection procedure is provided in Table 1 (N=1,721). Variable descriptions are provided in 
Table 3, Panel A. 
 
Panel B: Subsample for Asymmetric Timeliness Tests 
 
Notes: The sample selection procedure is described in Table 1 (N=1,152). Variable descriptions are provided in 
Table 3, Panel B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3
1 NET INCOME t
2 EBITDA t 0.80*
3 PERF COV EARNINGS t 0.50* 0.74*
4 CASH FLOW t+1 0.57* 0.61* 0.63*
1 2 3 4
1 NET INCOME t
2 EBITDA t 0.42*
3 PERF COV EARNINGS t 0.07* 0.75*
4 CASH FLOW t+1 0.35* 0.33* 0.29*
5 D (RETURN t < 0 ) -0.31* -0.24* -0.18* -0.85*
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Table 6 
Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition Estimated Using Different Definitions of Earnings 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is noted in the column heading. NET INCOMEt is the rolling four-quarter sum of net 
income (NI) ending in quarter t. EBITDAt is the rolling four-quarter sum of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (NI + XINTQ + DPQ + TXTQ) ending in quarter t. PERF COV EARNINGSt is annual 
earnings required by the bank lending agreement ending in quarter t. NET INCOMEt, EBITDAt, and PERF COV 
EARNINGSt are scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. RETURN is the annual market 
return, corresponding to the four fiscal quarters ending in quarter t. D is a dummy that represents negative RETURN. 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
INTERCEPT 0.018             0.221***             0.246***             
(0.87) (6.67) (7.61)
RETURN 0.002             0.184***             0.229***             
(0.07) (3.61) (4.80)
D -0.005           0.024             0.022             
(-0.18) (0.73) (0.83)
RETURN * D 0.337***             0.013             -0.318***           
(3.21) (0.12) (-3.20)
N 1,152 1,152 1,152
ADJRSQ 0.044             0.063             0.059             
0.339***             0.197*             -0.089           
(3.70) (1.95) (-1.09)Test of: RETURN + RETURN*D
NET INCOME t EBITDA PERF COV EARNINGS t
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Table 7 
Regressions of OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1 on Different Definitions of Earnings 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1. The independent variable is noted in the column 
heading. NET INCOMEt is the rolling four-quarter sum of net income (NI) ending in quarter t. EBITDAt is the 
rolling four-quarter sum of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (OIBDPQ + SPIQ + XIQ + 
DOQ) ending in quarter t. PERF COV EARNINGSt is annual earnings required by the bank lending agreement 
ending in quarter t. NET INCOMEt, EBITDAt, PERF COV EARNINGSt, and OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1 are 
scaled by assets at the end of the period. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
using a two-tailed test. Standard errors in the regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. 
 
NET 
INCOME t EBITDA t
PERF COV 
EARNINGS t
INTERCEPT 0.077***           0.043***           -0.009         
(21.82) (8.82) (-1.22)
EARNINGS VARIABLE 0.353***           0.347***           0.664***           
(7.47) (7.83) (11.72)
N 1,721 1,721 1,721
ADJRSQ 0.206           0.243           0.364           
ADJRSQ Difference vs. PERF COV EARNINGS  column 0.158           0.121           
Vuong Z 5.813***           5.309***           
EARNINGS VARIABLE
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Table 8 
Comparing contractual definitions for disclosers and non-disclosers 
 
		
Notes: This table describes the nature of adjustments to PERF COV EARNINGS for our sample firms and 
for a matched sample of firms that have a performance covenant in their loan contract but do not disclose 
the realizations of the performance covenant earnings number. Matching is based on size, industry, and the 
year the loan contract becomes effective. We were able to identify the contracts and associated PERF COV 
EARNINGS definitions for 90 sample firms and 79 control firms. The contractual definition of PERF COV 
EARNINGS is examined in each contract for evidence of adjustments for 1) taxes, 2) interest, 3) 
depreciation and amortization, 4) extraordinary items, 5) discontinued operations, 6) noncash items, and 7) 
nonrecurring items. If evidence for a particular adjustment is found, the variable is assigned a value of one, 
and a value of zero otherwise. The last row represents the sum of the six indicator variables for each 
contract. 
 
  
Sample Control Sample Control
TAX 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
INTEREST 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
DEPRECIATION 0.98 1.00 0.15 0.00
EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS 0.90 0.92 0.30 0.27
DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS 0.23 0.16 0.43 0.37
NONCASH ITEMS 0.91 0.96 0.29 0.19
NONRECURRING ITEMS 0.66 0.66 0.48 0.48
NUMBER OF ADJUSTMENTS 5.68 5.71 0.99 0.82
MEAN STD DEV
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Table 9 
Large sample evidence using the Compustat variable OIBDP as a proxy for PERF 
COV EARNINGS 
 
Panel A: Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is noted in the column heading. PERF COV EARNINGSt is annual earnings 
required by the bank lending agreement ending in quarter t. OIBDPt is the Compustat variable operating 
income before depreciation. PERF COV EARNINGSt and OIBDPt are scaled by market value of equity at 
the beginning of the period. RETURN is the annual market return, corresponding to the four fiscal quarters 
ending in quarter t. D is a dummy that represents negative RETURN. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-
statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 
 
Panel B: Cash Flow Predictive Ability 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1. The independent variable is noted in the 
column heading. PERF COV EARNINGSt is annual earnings required by the bank lending agreement 
ending in quarter t. OIBDPt is the Compustat variable operating income before depreciation. NET 
INCOMEt, OIBDPt, and OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1 are scaled by assets at the end of the period. ***, **, 
* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test. Standard errors in 
the regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
  
INTERCEPT 0.246***    0.240***    0.167***     
(7.61) (7.77) (60.18)
RETURN 0.229***    0.199***    0.148***     
(4.80) (4.53) (27.68)
D 0.022    0.021    0.018***     
(0.83) (0.73) (5.86)
RETURN * D -0.318***   -0.254***   -0.068***   
(-3.20) (-2.80) (-6.06)
N 1,152 1,141 72,750
ADJRSQ 0.059    0.053    0.085     
PERF COV EARNINGS t OIBDP t OIBDP t
Disclosure Sample Disclosure Sample Dealscan Sample
INTERCEPT -0.009   0.007    0.018***     
(-1.22) (0.75) (15.74)
EARNINGS VARIABLE 0.664***    0.590***    0.630***     
(11.72) (8.14) (68.74)
N 1,721 1,708 77,264
ADJRSQ 0.364    0.347    0.373     
Disclosure Sample Dealscan Sample
PERF COV EARNINGS t OIBDP t OIBDP t
Disclosure Sample
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Table 10 
Comparing Sample Firms to Dealscan Firms 
 
Panel A: Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition   
 
Notes: The dependent variable is noted in the column heading. NET INCOMEt is the rolling four-quarter 
sum of net income (NI) ending in quarter t. EBITDAt is the rolling four-quarter sum of earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (NI + XINTQ + DPQ + TXTQ) ending in quarter t. NET 
INCOMEt, and EBITDAt are scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. RETURN is 
the annual market return, corresponding to the four fiscal quarters ending in quarter t. D is a dummy that 
represents negative RETURN. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
using a two-tailed test. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. 
 
Panel B: Cash Flow Predictive Ability  
		
Notes: The dependent variable is OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1. The independent variable is noted in the 
column heading. NET INCOMEt is the rolling four-quarter sum of net income (NI) ending in quarter t. 
EBITDAt is the rolling four-quarter sum of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(OIBDPQ + SPIQ + XIQ + DOQ) ending in quarter t. NET INCOMEt, EBITDAt, and OPERATING CASH 
FLOWt+1 are scaled by assets at the end of the period. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test. Standard errors in the regressions are clustered by firm. T-
statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
  
Dealscan 
Sample
Disclosure 
Sample Difference
Dealscan 
Sample
Disclosure 
Sample Difference
INTERCEPT 0.040***           0.018           0.022           0.154***           0.221***           -0.066**         
(21.59) (0.87) (1.04) (45.54) (6.67) (-2.01)
RETURN -0.009**         0.002           -0.011         0.135***           0.184***           -0.048         
(-1.97) (0.07) (-0.40) (17.75) (3.61) (-0.95)
D 0.015***           -0.005         0.019           0.034***           0.024           0.010           
(4.77) (-0.18) (0.77) (8.64) (0.73) (0.32)
RETURN * D 0.391***           0.337***           0.055           0.158***           0.013           0.145           
(27.93) (3.21) (0.52) (9.53) (0.12) (1.34)
N 73,403 1,152 73,403 1,152
ADJRSQ 0.089           0.044           0.076           0.063           
NET INCOME t EBITDA t
Dealscan 
Sample
Disclosure 
Sample Difference
Dealscan 
Sample
Disclosure 
Sample Difference
INTERCEPT 0.091***        0.077***        0.014***        0.056***        0.043***        0.013***        
(99.56) (21.82) (3.99) (54.38) (8.82) (2.67)
EARNINGS VARIABLE 0.320***        0.353***        -0.033      0.377***        0.347***        0.030        
(33.66) (7.47) (-0.69) (43.49) (7.83) (0.68)
N 77,930 1,721 77,930 1,721
ADJRSQ 0.147        0.206        0.247        0.243        
NET INCOME t EBITDA t
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Table 11 
Comparing Sample Firms in the Pre-Disclosure Period to Sample Firms in 
Disclosure Period 
 
Panel A: Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition   
 
Notes: The dependent variable is noted in the column heading. NET INCOMEt is the rolling four-quarter 
sum of net income (NI) ending in quarter t. EBITDAt is the rolling four-quarter sum of earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (NI + XINTQ + DPQ + TXTQ) ending in quarter t. NET 
INCOMEt, and EBITDAt are scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. RETURN is 
the annual market return, corresponding to the four fiscal quarters ending in quarter t. D is a dummy that 
represents negative RETURN. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
using a two-tailed test. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. 
 
Panel B: Cash Flow Predictive Ability  
	
Notes: The dependent variable is OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1. The independent variable is noted in the 
column heading. NET INCOMEt is the rolling four-quarter sum of net income (NI) ending in quarter t. 
EBITDAt is the rolling four-quarter sum of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(OIBDPQ + SPIQ + XIQ + DOQ) ending in quarter t. NET INCOMEt, EBITDAt, and OPERATING CASH 
FLOWt+1 are scaled by assets at the end of the period. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test. Standard errors in the regressions are clustered by firm. T-
statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
Pre-Disclosure 
Quarters
Disclosure 
Quarters Difference
Pre-Disclosure 
Quarters
Disclosure 
Quarters Difference
INTERCEPT 0.052***           0.018           0.034           0.159***           0.221***           -0.061*         
(5.13) (0.87) (1.45) (9.23) (6.67) (-1.68)
RETURN -0.027         0.002           -0.029         0.180***           0.184***           -0.003         
(-1.03) (0.07) (-0.75) (3.36) (3.61) (-0.04)
D -0.005         -0.005         -0.000         0.033           0.024           0.009           
(-0.26) (-0.18) (-0.00) (1.35) (0.73) (0.21)
RETURN * D 0.256***           0.337***           -0.080         -0.015         0.013           -0.028         
(3.61) (3.21) (-0.71) (-0.14) (0.12) (-0.18)
N 1,936 1,152 1,936 1,152
ADJRSQ 0.060           0.044           0.084           0.063           
NET INCOME t EBITDA t
Pre-
Disclosure 
Quarters
Disclosure 
Quarters Difference
Pre-
Disclosure 
Quarters
Disclosure 
Quarters Difference
INTERCEPT 0.088***        0.077***        0.011**        0.058***        0.043***        0.015        
(21.79) (21.82) (2.26) (7.50) (8.82) (1.55)
EARNINGS VARIABLE 0.459***        0.353***        0.106        0.320***        0.347***        -0.027      
(6.78) (7.47) (1.15) (4.36) (7.83) (-0.31)
N 2,293 1,721 2,293 1,721
ADJRSQ 0.196        0.206        0.208        0.243        
NET INCOME t EBITDA t
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Table 12 
Comparison with pro forma I/B/E/S earnings  
 
Panel A: Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is noted in the column heading. IBESt is the rolling four-quarter sum of 
actual earnings, as recorded by IBES quarter t scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of the 
period. RETURN is the annual market return, corresponding to the four fiscal quarters ending in quarter t. D 
is a dummy that represents negative RETURN. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels using a two-tailed test. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. 
 
 
Panel B: Cash Flow Predictive Ability 
 
		
Notes: The dependent variable is OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1. The independent variable is IBES 
EARNINGSt, which is the rolling four-quarter sum of actual earnings, as recorded by IBES for the quarter t 
scaled by assets at the end of the period. OPERATING CASH FLOWt+1 is scaled by assets at the end of the 
period. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test. 
Standard errors in the regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates.  
INTERCEPT 0.060***      
(11.30)
RETURN 0.028***      
(2.65)
D 0.013      
(1.42)
RETURN * D 0.142**      
(2.16)
N 781
ADJRSQ 0.095      
0.170**      
(2.64)Test of: RETURN + RETURN*D
IBES
INTERCEPT 0.071***           
(12.73)
IBES EARNINGS 0.629***           
(7.18)
N 782
ADJRSQ 0.262           
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Figure 1 
Distributions of NET INCOME, EBITDA, and PERF COV EARNINGS 
 
 
Notes: This figure plots the distribution NET INCOMEt , EBITDAt, and PERF COV EARNINGSt , each 
scaled by TOTAL ASSETSt. NET INCOMEt is the rolling four-quarter sum of net income (NI) ending in 
quarter t. EBITDAt is the rolling four-quarter sum of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (NI + XINTQ + TXTQ + DPQ) ending in quarter t. PERF COV EARNINGSt is annual 
earnings required by the bank lending agreement for performance covenants ending in quarter t. 
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Figure 2 
Comparing NET INCOME to PERF COV EARNINGS 
 
Panel A: Ratio of NET INCOME to PERF COV EARNINGS 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: NET INCOME minus PERF COV EARNINGS scaled by assets 
 
 
Notes: Panel A plots the distribution of the ratio of NET INCOMEt to PERF COV EARNINGSt between -3.0 
and 3.0. Panel B plots the distribution of (PERF COV EARNINGSt - NET INCOMEt)/ASSETSt. Values less 
than 1.0 (0.0) on the horizontal axis of Panel A (Panel B) represent observations where PERF COV 
EARNINGSt is higher than NET INCOMEt. 
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Figure 3 
Comparing EBITDA to PERF COV EARNINGS 
 
Panel A: Ratio of EBITDA to PERF COV EARNINGS 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: EBITDA minus PERF COV EARNINGS scaled by assets 
 
 
Notes: Panel A plots the distribution of the ratio of EBITDAt to PERF COV EARNINGSt between -3.0 and 
3.0. Panel B plots the distribution of (PERF COV EARNINGSt - EBITDAt)/ASSETSt. Values less than 1.0 
(0.0) on the horizontal axis of Panel A (Panel B) represent observations where PERF COV EARNINGSt is 
higher than EBITDAt. 
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